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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Petitioner Cristian Guzman appeals from a ruling by 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that the so-called 
“stop-time rule,” as enacted by the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, div. C., 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (“IIRIRA”) 
(effective April 1, 1997), was not impermissibly retroactive 
as applied to his 1995 criminal offense.  The BIA rejected 
Petitioner’s argument that the application of the stop-time 
rule poses a “new disability” on his past conduct.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we will affirm.  
 
I.  Background 
 Petitioner is a 38-year-old citizen of the Dominican 
Republic.  He was admitted to the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident on October 8, 1994 and has continually 
resided here since that time.  A little more than a year after 
his admission, New York City police arrested Petitioner and 
charged him with Criminal Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, in violation of New York law.  Petitioner pled 
guilty to a lesser possession charge on December 19, 1995, 
and he was sentenced to three years’ probation.  In 2005, New 
York City police again arrested and charged Petitioner with 
Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in violation of 
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New York law.  Petitioner pled guilty and, on December 1, 
2005, was sentenced to time served.1  
 
 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) took 
custody of Petitioner and served him with a Notice to Appear 
(“NTA”) for removal proceedings on March 6, 2012, based 
on his 2005 conviction pursuant to Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), which authorized 
removal of:  
 
Any alien who at any time after 
admission has been convicted of a 
violation of (or a conspiracy or 
attempt to violate) any law or 
regulation of a State, the United 
States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance 
(as defined in section 802 of Title 
21), other than a single offense 
involving possession for one's 
own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana, is deportable. 
   
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Notably, although IIRIRA made 
various changes to the immigration laws, the same basis for 
removal appeared in pre-IIRIRA law as well, which would 
likewise have rendered Petitioner removable for his 1995 
offense.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994) (repealed 
1996) (using the term “entry” in place of “admission”).  
                                              
1 The Government notes several other of Petitioner’s arrests 
between 1995 and 2005, but we need not recount them here 
as they do not bear on this case. 
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However, the removal proceedings in 2012 were based on his 
2005, not his 1995, conviction. 
 
   A.  Statutory Framework 
 Prior to the passage of IIRIRA, an alien in removal 
proceedings could apply for a discretionary waiver of 
deportation, known as a “212(c) waiver” if he could show (1) 
seven years continuous presence, and (2) that he had not been 
convicted of one or more aggravated felonies for which a 
term of imprisonment of at least five years had been imposed.  
INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996); 
Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 556 (3d Cir. 2002).  IIRIRA 
repealed this provision and replaced it with a similar 
procedure known as cancellation of removal.  To be eligible 
for cancellation of removal, a legal permanent resident alien 
must (1) be “lawfully admitted for permanent residence for 
not less than 5 years,” (2) have “resided in the United States 
continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any 
status,” and (3) “not [have] been convicted of an aggravated 
felony.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).   
 
 However, IIRIRA also mandated a new scheme for 
calculating an alien’s period of continuous residence, 
whereby “any period of continuous residence or continuous 
physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to 
end . . . when the alien has committed an offense referred to 
in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the 
alien . . . removable from the United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(d)(1)(B).  This is commonly known as the “stop-time” 
rule.  Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 492 F.3d 226, 227 
(3d Cir. 2007).   
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   B.  Petitioner’s Removal Proceedings and the 
Immigration Judge’s Decision 
 
 Petitioner appeared before an immigration judge 
(“IJ”), conceded removability as charged, and submitted an 
application for cancellation of removal.  The Government 
argued that he was ineligible for this form of relief due to the 
stop-time rule, which stopped his accrual of the requisite 
seven years’ presence required for cancellation of removal 
upon the commission of his drug offense in 1995.  Petitioner 
argued that application of the stop-time rule of IIRIRA to 
render him ineligible for cancellation of removal due to his 
1995 offense would have an impermissibly retroactive effect.  
While he acknowledged that the 1995 offense rendered him 
immediately deportable with no opportunity for relief because 
he had been in the country for only one year at the time, 
Petitioner nonetheless argued that he could have tried to delay 
his deportation proceedings until he accrued the requisite 
seven years’ lawful continuous presence to become eligible 
for discretionary waiver under former INA § 212(c).  
Petitioner argued that this strategy was available to aliens 
prior to the passage of IIRIRA, and the fact that this 
opportunity was no longer available to him constituted a “new 
disability,” which, under Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 
U.S. 244, 269 (1994), would make its application to him 
impermissibly retroactive.  Petitioner also urged that 
retroactive application of the stop-time rule was arbitrary and 
capricious in that it punished lawful permanent residents who 
committed crimes within seven years of their admission, 
whereas residents who had accrued seven years’ presence 
before committing qualifying offenses were not subject to the 
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rule.  Additionally, Petitioner asked to be able to terminate his 
removal proceedings in order to pursue naturalization.2  
 
 The IJ held a hearing on February 22, 2013, at the 
conclusion of which she rendered an oral decision denying 
Petitioner’s motion to continue or terminate his proceedings 
and finding Petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal 
because his 1995 offense stopped his accrual of continuous 
presence pursuant to the stop-time rule.  The IJ found that the 
stop-time rule itself was not arbitrary and capricious under 
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 490 (2011).  The IJ 
denied Petitioner’s motion to terminate proceedings to pursue 
a naturalization application for lack of an affirmative 
communication from DHS regarding Petitioner’s prima facie 
eligibility for naturalization, as required by the BIA’s 
decision in In re Acosta Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103 (BIA 
2007). 
 
 
 
                                              
2 In addition, Petitioner requested a further continuance to 
pursue post-conviction relief pursuant to Padilla v. Kentucky, 
559 U.S. 356 (2010) (holding that the Sixth Amendment 
requires defense counsel to advise their clients whether a 
guilty plea carries a risk of deportation).  The IJ denied 
Petitioner’s request to further continue proceedings to pursue 
post-conviction relief under Padilla pursuant to Chaidez v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (2013), which held that 
“defendants whose convictions became final prior to Padilla 
. . . cannot benefit from its holding.” As this is not an issue on 
appeal, we do not address it.  
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   A.  Petitioner’s Proceedings Before the BIA and the 
BIA’s Decision 
 
 Petitioner raised the same arguments before the BIA, 
and also urged that the IJ erred in not permitting him to 
concurrently apply for both a 212(c) waiver and cancellation 
of removal.  The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision.  It held that 
Petitioner’s 1995 controlled substance offense stopped his 
accrual of continuous presence short of the requisite seven 
years for purposes of cancellation of removal.  The BIA 
explained that the stop-time rule imposed no “new disability” 
on Petitioner because the 1995 offense rendered him 
immediately deportable with no possibility of relief had he 
been placed in deportation proceedings at that time, prior to 
the passage of IIRIRA, because he lacked the requisite seven 
years’ continuous presence for a 212(c) waiver.  The BIA 
reasoned that “[a]t the time of [Petitioner’s] conviction in 
1995, he was immediately amenable to deportation from this 
country under pre-IIRIRA law.” A.R. 4.  Petitioner’s options 
pre-and post-IIRIRA were therefore no different, and the 
application of IIRIRA’s stop-time rule to him was not 
impermissibly retroactive. 
 
 The BIA also rejected Petitioner’s contention that he 
should have been permitted to simultaneously apply for a 
212(c) waiver and cancellation of removal.  It observed that 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(6) explicitly precludes an alien from 
applying for both 212(c) waiver and cancellation of removal 
and that, even if he could obtain a 212(c) waiver 
notwithstanding his 1995 conviction, “the conviction would 
still be deemed to have ended [Petitioner’s] period of 
continuous residence for purposes of cancellation of removal 
because the granting of 212(c) relief does not serve to 
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universally pardon, expunge, or eliminate all negative 
immigration consequences stemming from an alien’s criminal 
conviction.”  Id. 
 
 In addition, the BIA ruled that the IJ properly declined 
to terminate Petitioner’s removal proceedings under 8 C.F.R 
§ 1239.2(f) because he failed to attempt to obtain an 
affirmative communication from the DHS addressing his 
prima facie eligibility for naturalization.  
 
   B.  Arguments on Appeal 
 On appeal, Petitioner repeats the same arguments that 
the BIA rejected.  Relying on I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 
(2001), he argues that an alien making the decision to forego 
his right to trial and plead guilty, like the petitioner in St. Cyr, 
does so assuming the state of the law of the time: when 
Petitioner pled guilty to a deportable offense in 1995, he 
expected to retain the possibility of obtaining a 212(c) waiver 
from deportation in the future, namely, after being in the 
country for an additional six years.  He urges that applying 
the stop-time rule of IIRIRA to pre-IIRIRA conduct 
forecloses that possibility and is therefore impermissibly 
retroactive.  Petitioner urges that, but for the stop-time rule, 
he would have accrued the seven years’ requisite presence 
needed for either type of removal—pre- and post-IIRIRA—
prior to his 2005 offense.  Accordingly, he contends, the stop-
time rule should not apply to him.  
 
 In the alternative, Petitioner argues that the BIA 
wrongly affirmed the IJ’s decision not to terminate removal 
proceedings to allow him to make a prima facie case of 
eligibility for naturalization pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f), 
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based on the fact that he did not have an affirmative 
communication from the DHS indicating such eligibility.3  As 
the regulation at issue states that an alien must make a prima 
facie case of eligibility for naturalization, the BIA’s decision 
in In re Acosta Hidalgo, which interpreted this regulation to 
require a communication from the DHS establishing such 
eligibility, does not comport with the text of the regulation 
and deprives Petitioner of the opportunity to do what the 
regulation says—i.e., establish his prima facie eligibility to 
the court.  
 The Government argues that no genuine issue of 
retroactivity is presented here, as Petitioner’s removal 
                                              
3 Section 1239.2(f) provides:  
 
An immigration judge may 
terminate removal proceedings to 
permit the alien to proceed to a 
final hearing on a pending 
application or petition for 
naturalization when the alien has 
established prima facie eligibility 
for naturalization and the matter 
involves exceptionally appealing 
or humanitarian factors; in every 
other case, the removal hearing 
shall be completed as promptly as 
possible notwithstanding the 
pendency of an application for 
naturalization during any state of 
the proceedings.   
 
8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f). 
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proceedings are predicated on his 2005 offense, which post-
dates IIRIRA. Since cancellation of removal under IIRIRA 
did not exist at the time of Petitioner’s 1995 conviction, he 
had no right to it then, and since Petitioner does not meet the 
requirements for cancellation of removal, he has no right to it 
now.  In the alternative, the Government argues that we 
should follow the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Heaven v. 
Gonzales, 473 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2006), and hold that, even if 
the stop-time rule is being applied retroactively here, such 
application is not impermissibly retroactive.  Petitioner’s 
1995 controlled substance offense rendered him immediately 
deportable without eligibility for relief under 212(c) and, as 
such, application of the stop-time rule created no “new 
disability” because “[d]eportation is the consequence he 
receives upon retroactive application of the stop-time rule just 
as it is the consequence he would have received immediately 
[in 1995] following his criminal conduct.”  Brief for 
Respondent at 23 (quoting Martinez v. I.N.S., 523 F.3d 365, 
373-74 (2d Cir. 2008)).  The Government adds: “Congress 
certainly has never invested [Petitioner] with a substantive 
right to purposefully delay his proceedings or created a settled 
expectation of benefiting from delays in the administrative 
process.”  Brief for Respondent at 24 (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
at 321-22).4  
 
                                              
4 The Government also argued that this court lacks the 
jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under the INA, 
while conceding that we retain jurisdiction to review 
questions of law and constitutional claims pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  Petitioner has clearly raised a 
question of law, the retroactive application of a statute, which 
affords jurisdiction here. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We review rulings of the BIA under INA § 242, 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  Our review is limited to 
constitutional claims and questions of law.  Id.; see also 
Paredes v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 528 F.3d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 
2008).  Where “the BIA adopts and affirms the decision of 
the IJ, as well as provides its own reasoning,” we review both 
the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions.  Hashimi v. Att’y Gen. of the 
U.S., 531 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2008).  We review questions 
of law de novo.  Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 473 
F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 2007).  However, we will defer to the 
BIA’s reasonable interpretations of the statutes it is charged 
with administering.  I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 
424 (1999). 
DISCUSSION 
 Petitioner has not previously disputed, nor does he 
now, that both his 1995 and 2005 offenses rendered him 
removable when committed.  Rather, he disputes the 
application of a provision of IIRIRA, the “stop-time rule,” 
which precludes aliens who have committed deportable 
offenses from being spared deportation if they have accrued 
seven years of continuous presence in the United States, as 
that “ability” existed under pre-IIRIRA law.  The crux of 
Petitioner’s argument—as it was before the IJ and the BIA—
is that the application of the stop-time rule to his 1995 offense 
to disqualify him from cancellation of removal relief is 
impermissibly retroactive because it imposes a “new 
disability” on him for conduct that pre-dates IIRIRA.  
Specifically, he has been deprived of the opportunity to delay 
deportation proceedings while accumulating the continuous 
seven years’ presence required for discretionary relief from 
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removal, an opportunity he had when he pled to his 1995 
offense.  Applying the stop-time rule of IIRIRA, enacted in 
1996, disqualified him from any such relief.  As we have 
never written precedentially on the issue of whether the stop-
time rule should apply retroactively, we do so here. 
 
   A.  Statutory Framework Prior and Subsequent to 
IIRIRA 
 
 As noted above, under the immigration laws in effect 
in November 1995, when Petitioner committed his first drug 
offense, legal permanent residents who were subject to 
deportation, but who had resided in the United States for 
seven consecutive years, were eligible to apply for a 
discretionary waiver of deportation under INA § 212(c).  See 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996).5  “The decision of 
whether to award section 212(c) relief involved only a 
balancing of the adverse factors evidencing an alien’s 
undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and 
humane considerations presented in his behalf to determine 
whether the granting of [a section 212(c) waiver] appear[ed] 
in the best interests of this country.” Martinez, 523 F.3d at 
368 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in 
original) (quoting Kai Tung Chan v. Gantner, 464 F.3d 289, 
295 (2d. Cir. 2006).  Notably, although the decision to grant a 
212(c) waiver was a discretionary one, a “substantial 
                                              
5 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996) provides: “Aliens 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily 
proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of 
deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished 
domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the 
discretion of the Attorney General . . . .” 
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percentage” of applications were granted.  St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 
296 (noting that between 1989 and 1995, over 10,000 section 
212(c) waiver applications were granted).  
 
 A lawful permanent resident in deportation 
proceedings could seek a discretionary waiver of deportation 
under former INA § 212(c), if he could show (1) seven 
consecutive years of lawful continuous physical presence and 
(2) that he had not been convicted of one or more aggravated 
felonies for which a term of imprisonment of at least five 
years had been imposed.  Perez, 294 F.3d at 556.  Aliens 
accrued time toward continuous residence and physical 
presence requirements until they applied for relief.  Martinez, 
523 F.3d at 368.  Often, an alien would manage to delay his 
removal process in order to accumulate seven years’ 
presence, which was one of the reasons Congress passed 
IIRIRA.  Id.  This delay strategy was the exact abuse of the 
system Congress intended to correct in IIRIRA by eliminating 
section 212(c), replacing it with cancellation of removal, and 
enacting the stop-time rule.  Arca-Pineda v. Att’y Gen. of the 
U.S., 527 F.3d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing  H.R. Rep. No. 
104–469(I) (1996)); In re Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I. & N.  Dec. 
1236, 1243 (BIA 2000) (same). 
 
 IIRIRA, which was enacted on September 30, 1996 
and went into effect on April 1, 1997, eliminated the 212(c) 
waiver, and replaced it with cancellation of removal, 
INA § 240A(a).  Under INA § 240A(a), a legal permanent 
resident must satisfy three conditions to qualify for 
cancellation of removal relief: the alien (1) must have been 
“lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 
years,” (2) must have “resided in the United States 
continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any 
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status,” and (3) must “not [have] been convicted of any 
aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  In addition to 
instituting this new cancellation of removal scheme, IIRIRA 
established a new stop-time rule in INA § 240A(d)(1) for 
calculating an alien’s period of continuous residence or 
physical presence.  The accrual of continuous presence for 
purposes of the seven years terminates when the alien has 
committed an offense “that renders the alien inadmissible to 
the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or 
removable from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 
1227(a)(4) of this title, whichever is earliest.” 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B).  Once the period of continuous 
residence is terminated, it is not restarted by subsequent 
events.  Briseno-Flores, 492 F.3d at 230. 
 
   B.  Retroactive Application of the Stop-Time Rule, 
INA § 240A(d)  
 
 In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the Supreme Court 
confirmed the longstanding presumption against retroactive 
legislation, emphasizing that “[e]lementary considerations of 
fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to 
know what the law is and to conform their conduct 
accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly 
disrupted.”  511 U.S. at 265.  At the same time, the Court 
acknowledged that Congress has the power, within 
constitutional limits, to enact laws with retroactive effect.  
The Landgraf court articulated a two-step test for determining 
when a statute could be applied retroactively.  Under the first 
step, the court must ascertain “whether Congress has 
expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.”  Id. at 280.  
If the answer is yes, the inquiry ends there.  If, however, “the 
statute contains no such express command,” id., the court 
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must move to the second step and decide whether the 
application of the statute would have an impermissibly 
“retroactive effect,” that is, the court must assess “whether the 
new provision attaches new legal consequences to events 
completed before its enactment.”  Id. at 269-70.  A statute is 
impermissibly retroactive if it “takes away or impairs vested 
rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new 
obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, 
in respect to transactions or considerations already past.”  Id. 
at 269 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
 Congress was silent with respect to the retroactive 
application of the stop-time rule, while it expressly mandated 
the retroactive application of certain other provisions of 
IIRIRA. For example, in the transitional rules, Congress 
expressly mandated that the stop-time rule applied 
retroactively to applications for suspension of deportation that 
were pending at the time of IIRIRA’s enactment.  Briseno-
Flores, 492 F.3d at 230.  It also expressly mandated the 
retroactive application of the expanded definition of 
aggravated felony.  See IIRIRA § 321(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-
628 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including 
any effective date), the term [“aggravated felony”] applies 
regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, 
or after [September 30, 1996].”); see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 
318-19.  In contrast, the text of § 1229b(d)(1) says nothing 
whatsoever about retroactive application.  Therefore, we have 
no trouble concluding that it is ambiguous, and an analysis of 
whether the application of the stop-time rule is impermissibly 
retroactive under step two of Landgraf is appropriate here. 
 
 We disagree with the Government that this case 
presents no issue of retroactivity at all.  Our focus is not 
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merely on the date of the offense that served as the basis for 
removal and the law in effect at that time.  Rather, our focus 
is broader.  As the Court reasoned in St. Cyr, the fact “that 
deportation is not punishment for past crimes does not mean 
that we cannot consider an alien’s reasonable reliance on the 
continued availability of discretionary relief from deportation 
when deciding whether the elimination of such relief has 
retroactive effect.” Id. at 324.  The application of a post-
IIRIRA provision, namely, the stop-time rule, to alter the 
availability of certain relief based on conduct that took place 
pre-IIRIRA clearly has a retroactive effect.  The issue is 
whether such effect is impermissibly retroactive. 
 
 This brings us to step two of Landgraf.  As noted 
above, the stop-time rule is impermissibly retroactive if it 
“attaches new legal consequences” to events completed 
before the enactment of IIRIRA, that is, if it “takes away or 
impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates 
a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new 
disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already 
past.”  511 U.S. at 269-70 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 
F. Cas. 756, 767 (No. 13, 156) (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (Story, J.)).  
We note that while the inquiry may be broad, the application 
under step two is very fact-specific.  In St. Cyr, the Supreme 
Court held impermissible the retroactive application of the 
stop-time rule to an alien who had accrued seven years 
presence prior to IIRIRA but whose removal proceedings did 
not commence until after the passage of IIRIRA because his 
right to a 212(c) waiver had vested before the passage of the 
new law.  533 U.S. at 326.  St. Cyr had pled guilty to a 
removable offense, foregoing his right to a trial, under the 
assumption that the consequence of doing so at the time 
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would not disqualify him from 212(c) relief.  Id. at 321-22.  
IIRIRA replaced 212(c) waiver with cancellation of removal 
and disqualified St. Cyr from removal relief based on the type 
of offense he had committed.  The Court held that the 
application of IIRIRA to St. Cyr created a new disability, 
defining it as the “elimination of any possibility of § 212(c) 
relief for people who entered into plea agreements with the 
expectation that they would be eligible for such relief.”  Id. at 
321.  The Court reasoned that the quid pro quo nature of plea 
agreements and the attendant waiver of some constitutional 
rights by a defendant, particularly when immigration status is 
at stake, dictates that attaching new legal consequences or a 
new disability—namely, elimination of the availability of 
212(c) relief—would amount to an impermissible retroactive 
application.  Id.  Accordingly, the Court held that the section 
212(c) waiver remains available for aliens “whose 
convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, 
notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible 
for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then 
in effect.”  Id. at 326. 
 
 Similarly, in Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the stop-time rule of 
IIRIRA was impermissibly retroactive when applied to stop 
an alien’s accrual of seven years’ continuous residence when 
based on “a conviction, obtained pursuant to a guilty plea, for 
a crime that did not render an alien deportable at the time of 
the plea.”  468 F.3d 1190, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006).  In 1993 
Sinotes-Cruz pled guilty to two counts of attempted 
aggravated assault.  Id. at 1202.  The court found it 
“undisputed that at the time of his plea, his conviction did not 
render him deportable.”  Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 
1251(a)(2)(A)(i) (1993)).  IIRIRA reclassified his crime, 
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making him deportable for having been convicted of a crime 
involving moral turpitude, committed within five years of 
admission, for which a sentence of a year or longer could 
have been imposed.  Id.  Similar to Petitioner’s case, DHS 
commenced removal proceedings against Sinotes-Cruz based 
on a deportable offense he committed after IIRIRA’s passage.  
Id. at 1197.  Although Sinotes-Cruz had accrued the requisite 
seven years continuous presence before IIRIRA’s passage, 
the Government argued that his time should be stopped on the 
date of his pre-IIRIRA conviction, which IIRIRA reclassified 
as a crime of moral turpitude.  The court held that the 
retroactive application of the stop-time rule to Sinotes-Cruz’s 
pre-IIRIRA conviction was impermissible under the second 
step of the Landgraf analysis, reasoning that he had, in 
pleading guilty, given up valuable rights, including the right 
to go to trial, “in the justifiable expectation that [his] plea[] 
would have no effect on [his] immigration status.”  Id. at 
1202.  
 
 St. Cyr and Sinotes-Cruz are different from the instant 
case in two important respects.  First, while IIRIRA 
reclassified the crimes that the petitioners in St. Cyr and 
Sinotes-Cruz committed so as to produce harsher effects, no 
such reclassification took place here.  Petitioner’s 1995 
offense rendered him deportable and ineligible for 212(c) 
relief, because he had not accrued seven years’ continuous 
residence.  IIRIRA did not reclassify this offense or change it 
in any way.  A controlled substance offense rendered an alien 
deportable in 1995, just as it would today, and eligible for 
removal relief provided the alien has accrued seven years 
continuous residence, just as it would today. 
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 Second, in both St. Cyr and Sinotes-Cruz, the 
petitioners had accrued the requisite seven years’ continuous 
presence to be eligible for 212(c) relief prior to the passage of 
IIRIRA.  They pled guilty to a non-qualifying crime under the 
reasonable assumption that doing so would not affect their 
immigration status.  Their eligibility for 212(c) relief had 
vested prior to the time that IIRIRA changed the rules, 
replacing 212(c) with the stricter cancellation of removal 
procedure.  The same is not true in Petitioner’s case.  At the 
time of his 1995 conviction, Petitioner had been residing in 
the United States for only a year.  When IIRIRA was passed 
in 1996, taking effect in 1997, Petitioner had not come close 
to accruing the seven years continuous presence required for 
212(c) relief.  He had no vested right because he was 
ineligible for any form of removal relief when IIRIRA was 
passed, and is ineligible for any form of removal relief today 
because the stop-time rule disqualifies him.  There have been 
no “new legal consequences” imposed on Petitioner as a 
result of the application of the rule.  St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321. 
  
 Petitioner’s situation is much more akin to that of the 
petitioners in Martinez and Heaven.  In Martinez, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the stop-time rule 
did not have an impermissible retroactive effect when applied 
to an alien’s deportable drug offense, committed prior to the 
passage of IIRIRA, to prevent him from obtaining 
cancellation of removal for a deportable crime committed 
after the passage of IIRIRA.  523 F.3d at 377.  The court 
reasoned that if the alien had been “captured and successfully 
prosecuted [for his pre-IIRIRA crime] . . . and the INS had 
obtained a deportation order promptly after he committed the 
offense, he could have been deported without the possibility 
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of relief because he would not, at the time, have accrued the 
seven years required by the repealed INA § 212(c).”  Id. at 
374.  Essentially, “IIRIRA, as applied to petitioner here, did 
not change the consequence of [his] criminal act.”  Id. at 375.  
Similarly in Heaven the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
applied the stop-time rule retroactively to an alien who had 
committed a deportable offense pre-IIRIRA to disqualify him 
from cancellation of removal, reasoning also that IIRIRA had 
caused no “new legal consequences to events completed 
before its enactment.”  473 F.3d at 173.  
 
 Petitioner seizes on Vartelas v. Holder as dictating the 
outcome in his favor, and specifically its use of the term “new 
disability.”  132 S. Ct. 1479, 1482 (2012).  But Vartelas does 
not help Petitioner.  In Vartelas, the Supreme Court refused to 
retroactively apply an IIRIRA provision preventing lawful 
permanent resident aliens from departing, even briefly, from 
the United States without having to seek admission upon 
return.  Prior to IIRIRA, lawful permanent residents with a 
felony conviction were able to briefly travel abroad and return 
to the United States without applying for readmission.  Id. at 
1483.  Lawful permanent residents were not regarded as 
making an “entry” upon their return “from innocent, casual, 
and brief excursion[s] . . . outside this country’s borders.”  Id. 
at 1484 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in 
original) (quoting Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 461-62 
(1963)).  IIRIRA § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) changed this rule.  
Under the new law, lawful permanent residents returning 
from any trip abroad would be regarded as seeking 
“admission” if they had committed an offense identified in 
section 1182(a)(2), which included “a crime involving moral 
turpitude … or conspiracy to commit such a crime.”  Id. at 
1485 (citing § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)).  It essentially allowed DHS 
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to refuse entry to legal permanent resident aliens who had 
committed certain crimes if they traveled abroad, even 
though, prior to IIRIRA, those aliens were not subject to 
admission procedures upon their return to the United States.  
Id. at 1485.  Vartelas pled guilty to a felony in 1994, and in 
the years after his conviction and after IIRIRA’s passage, he 
regularly traveled to Greece to visit his aging parents.  Id. at 
1485.  In 2003, when he returned from a week-long trip to 
Greece, he was classified as an alien seeking “admission” 
based on his 1994 conviction.  Id.  He was placed in removal 
proceedings and sought relief on the basis that “IIRIRA’s new 
‘admission’ provision . . . did not reach back to deprive him 
of lawful resident status based on his pre-IIRIRA conviction.”  
Id. at 1486.  The Supreme Court held that application of the 
new rule to Vartelas was effectively a ban on travel outside 
the United States.  The Court found that this was most 
certainly a  “new disability” in that, due to past events, 
namely, his pre-IIRIRA guilty plea and conviction, permanent 
residents situated as Vartelas would lose “the ability to travel 
abroad” and “face potential banishment.”  Id. at 1487-88.  
The law in effect when Vartelas made the decision to plead 
guilty imposed no such restriction.  The Court characterized 
this change as “a harsh penalty, made all the more devastating 
if it means enduring separation from close family members.” 
Id. at 1488 (footnote omitted).  
 
 Petitioner faces no such harsh penalty.  When pleading 
guilty, Vartelas did so under the correct assumption that the 
law at the time of his plea did not preclude him from short 
travels outside of the United States.  IIRIRA imposed a new 
disability on him by taking from him the ability to travel to 
visit his aging parents, something he was clearly able to do 
without any adverse consequences when he pled guilty.  
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Petitioner, on the other hand, had no right or ability to seek a 
waiver from deportation when he pled guilty in 1995.  The 
instant he committed his offense before meeting the seven-
year residency requirement for suspension of deportation, he 
was deportable.  See INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Petitioner asks us to characterize his 
“disability” as losing the opportunity to delay his deportation 
proceedings until he reached the seven years’ requisite 
presence if, hypothetically, such proceedings had been 
brought against him at the time.  He focuses on the word 
“disability” as if he should have the ability to deliberately 
delay proceedings or attempt to evade the authorities, hoping 
to accrue seven years without deportation.  But “disability” 
must mean that one has a present ability which is then lost.  
Petitioner had no ability under prior law, only a hope and 
speculation.  Unlike the petitioner in Vartelas, who accepted a 
guilty plea relying on the existing law that did not bar his 
right to travel abroad, Petitioner’s rights were no different 
when he accepted his plea than they are today.  Neither the 
opportunity to delay deportation proceedings nor the chance 
to evade the authorities, with the goal of avoiding deportation 
in order to become eligible for relief, creates a new disability.  
Accordingly, the decision to apply the stop-time rule to 
Petitioner is not impermissibly retroactive. 
 
   C.  Petitioner’s Remaining Arguments 
 1. Whether the BIA’s Decision was Arbitrary and 
Capricious  
 
 Relying on Judulang, Petitioner argues that retroactive 
application of the stop-time rule is arbitrary and capricious 
and thus, not entitled to any deference.  132 S. Ct. at 490 
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(“We must reverse and agency policy when we cannot discern 
a reason for it.”).  In Judulang, the Supreme Court considered 
the eligibility of aliens charged with deportability to seek a 
waiver under section 212(c), although the statute limited this 
relief to aliens charged with inadmissibility.  The BIA had 
extended relief under section 212(c) to aliens charged with 
deportability, but only if the ground of deportation was 
comparable to a ground of inadmissibility.  Id. at 480-81.  In 
applying this to aliens who were deportable, the BIA based its 
grant of relief on whether the ground for deportation charged 
by DHS had a close analogue in the statute’s list of exclusion 
grounds.  Id. at 481-82.  The Court found this approach 
arbitrary and capricious because it “hing[ed] a deportable 
alien’s eligibility for discretionary relief on the chance 
correspondence between statutory categories—a matter 
irrelevant to the alien’s fitness to reside in this country.”  Id. 
at 484.   
 
 Petitioner argues that Judulang limits the BIA to 
interpreting a statute in a way that is rational, non-arbitrary 
and tied to the purposes of the immigration laws.  He urges 
that the BIA’s decision to apply the stop-time rule to him 
conflicts with the purposes of the immigration laws because it 
treats legal permanent resident aliens who commit deportable 
crimes differently, depending on when they committed the 
crime.  Those aliens who commit deportable crimes after 
seven years’ requisite presence are allowed to apply for 
waiver from deportation, while those who commit a crime 
before such requisite presence are not.  Petitioner’s argument 
is markedly different from Judulang in one important respect: 
his is an objection to the stop-time rule itself, as enacted by 
Congress, not the BIA’s application of it, and “Congress has 
plenary power to pass legislation concerning the admission 
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and exclusion of aliens.”  Acosta v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 
226 (3d Cir. 2003).  Congress may have rationally concluded 
that an alien who has resided in the United States for a longer 
period of time should have a greater right to stay in the 
country than one who has resided here for a shorter period of 
time.  Because the stop-time rule is one that Congress, and 
not the BIA, created, the argument that the BIA acted 
arbitrarily in applying it is misplaced. 
 
 2. Whether the BIA Erred in Finding that Petitioner 
Could Not Apply for 212(c)Waiver and Cancellation of 
Removal Concurrently  
 
 Petitioner argues that the BIA and IJ should have 
allowed him to apply for relief under section 212(c) as well as 
cancellation of removal concurrently.  He argues that 
although section 1229b(c)(6) provides: “[a]n alien whose 
removal has previously been canceled under [cancellation of 
removal] . . . or who has been granted relief under section 
[212(c)]” shall be “ineligible for relief,”  8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(c)(6),  this provision does not make clear whether 
aliens may apply concurrently for both, based on its use of the 
word “previously.”  Additionally, he points to Munoz-Yepez 
v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 347 (8th Cir. 2006) (denying 
concurrent applications based on Congressional intent) and 
Garcia-Jimenez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(denying concurrent applications based on statutory 
interpretation) to demonstrate that the meaning of this 
provision is unclear, and urges this court to resolve this issue.  
The BIA believed that there was no ambiguity in 8 U.S.C. 
1229b(c)(6), in that it clearly precluded an alien from 
applying for both, but noted in addition that even if 
Petitioner’s 1995 conviction were waived under section 
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212(c), the conviction would still end his period of 
continuous residence, because “the granting of 212(c) relief 
does not serve to universally pardon, expunge, or eliminate all 
negative immigration consequences stemming from an alien’s 
criminal conviction.”  A.R. 4.  On appeal, Petitioner 
continues to assert the right to apply for 212(c) and 
cancellation of removal concurrently, acknowledging that he 
needs both forms of relief in order to prevail.  Petitioner’s 
counsel conceded during oral argument that, if we concluded 
that the application of the stop-time rule was not 
impermissibly retroactive as applied to Petitioner’s pre-
IIRIRA crime, we need not reach the issue of whether 
concurrent applications are permitted.  As we have so held, 
the issue is moot.  We note in addition, however, that, as the 
BIA observed, Petitioner is also foreclosed from urging that if 
a 212(c) waiver were granted, his 1995 conviction would not 
serve as a bar to cancellation, because in Rodriguez-Munoz v. 
Gonzales, 419 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 2005), we specifically 
held that a grant of 212(c) waiver does not nullify the 
underlying conviction and accordingly, it still exists for 
purposes of cancellation of removal analysis.  Therefore, even 
if Petitioner were to somehow be granted a 212(c) waiver, he 
would still be barred from cancellation of removal relief 
under Rodriguez-Munoz.   
 
 3. Whether the BIA Improperly Refused To Dismiss 
Petitioner’s Case so He Could Pursue Naturalization 
 
 Finally, Petitioner contends that the IJ should have 
allowed him to terminate his removal proceedings so that he 
could pursue naturalization.  In making this argument, 
Petitioner urges that the BIA’s interpretation of its regulation 
governing the termination of removal proceedings in In re 
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Acosta Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103 (BIA 2007) is 
inconsistent with the plain language of the requirements of 
the regulation.  The regulation at issue provides:  
 
An immigration judge may 
terminate removal proceedings to 
permit the alien to proceed to a 
final hearing on a pending 
application or petition for 
naturalization when the alien has 
established prima facie eligibility 
for naturalization and the matter 
involves exceptionally appealing 
or humanitarian factors . . . . 
 
8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f).  He contends that in In re Acosta 
Hidalgo, the BIA improperly added a requirement that is not 
set forth in the regulation, namely, that DHS must attest to an 
alien’s prima facie eligibility for naturalization, through an 
affirmative communication, prior to termination of removal 
proceedings.  However, petitioner fails to acknowledge our 
decision in Zegrean v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 602 F.3d 273, 
274 (3d Cir. 2010), in which we upheld this interpretation as 
reasonable.  We decline to revisit that ruling here.  Even if we 
were to do so, Petitioner’s argument suffers from another 
procedural flaw—namely, his failure to ever present his 
application to a local USCIS field office.  The absence of 
evidence demonstrating that Petitioner took any measures to 
formally request a prima facie determination from USCIS 
undermines his argument that his removal proceedings should 
have been terminated pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f). 
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CONCLUSION 
 Petitioner’s argument that the loss of opportunity to 
delay deportation proceedings creates a “new disability” 
under Landgraf is unconvincing.  Petitioner was deportable in 
1995 with no avenue for relief, just as he is deportable today.  
The passage of IIRIRA did not change the legal consequences 
that face Petitioner as a result of his 1995 and 2005 
convictions.  Petitioner’s remaining arguments are far less 
compelling, and fail just the same.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the BIA and deny Petitioner’s petition for review. 
